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Abstract: 
We present empirical evidence that the marked rise in liquidity in 2001-2007 
was due to large and persistent current account deficits and loose monetary 
policy.  If this increase in liquidity was a pre-condition for the financial crisis 
that began in July 2007, we can conclude that loose monetary and the 
deterioration in current account balances were causes of the financial crisis. 
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1) Introduction 
The global financial crisis that began in July 2007 looks set to run for some 
time and to have profound effects on the global economy.  The magnitude of 
the event and the scale of the disruption caused has led to much speculation 
as to the deeper causes of the crisis. 
 Three main factors have been discussed.  Loose monetary policy in the 
years before the crisis, especially in the US, has been suggested as a major 
cause.  This view is particularly associated with John Taylor, who has argued 
(eg Taylor 2008, 2008a) that in 2001-2006 US interest rates were below those 
implied by a Taylor rule, by up to 2 percentage points (see also Calomiris, 
2008).  It is suggested that loose monetary policy fuelled the rapid rise in 
house prices in this period, led to fewer mortgage defaults and so led to the 
over-pricing of mortgage-backed securities (which assumed the unusually low 
default rates in the early 2000s were the norm).   
 Other commentators and policymakers (e.g. Caballero et al, 2008, 
Morris, 2008, Bean, 2008) have highlighted the importance of global 
imbalances.  Large current account surpluses in emerging economies with 
under-developed financial markets, especially China, it is argued, led to large 
financial flows that drove down the interest rate in the US and other 
developed economies.  Coupled with a decline in savings rates, especially in 
the US and UK, this led to a wave of financial innovation that created ever 
more complex products attempting to provide high returns while maintaining 
asset values.  A third widely-identified factor is loose financial regulation (e.g. 
Borio, 2008).  The very rapid growth in off-balance sheet risks and large 
investments in poorly-understood financial products, it is argued, created the 
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pre-conditions for the rapid deterioration in financial markets that occurred in 
the summer of 2007 at the onset of the financial crisis.  
 In this paper, we provide a preliminary assessment of these ideas in 
the case of the UK economy.  We focus on the amount of liquidity in financial 
markets.  The rapid innovation in financial markets and the growth of arguably 
excessive risk-taking which led to the crisis would not have been possible 
without the build-up of liquidity in preceding years.   Therefore the causes of 
this increase in liquidity can be seen as causes of the financial crisis2.  We 
estimate the determinants of liquidity in the UK using time series data, 
examining in particular whether liquidity is affected by measures of global 
imbalances and the looseness of monetary policy.  One weakness of our 
approach is that we cannot assess the contribution of regulation of financial 
markets since time series measures of the vigilance of financial regulation are 
not available.  As a result, we cannot assess whether different regulatory 
actions would have been able to avert the crisis. 
 Various measures of liquidity have been used in the literature, 
reflecting bid-ask spreads (e.g. Kyle, 1985; Eckbo and Norli, 2002), the price 
impact of trades (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996) and return reversal 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003); Fujimoto (2004) provides a comprehensive 
review.  In this paper we use the Bank of England index of liquidity, which 
combines these various aspects of liquidity into a single composite measure 
that reflects both national and global factors and reflects liquidity on financial 
markets in general, rather than specifically on the stock market (the focus of 
most other studies).  
                                                 
2 Evidence that liquidity is a key indicator in predicting previous financial crises (Adalid and 
Detken, 2009) also suggests using liquidity as an indicator of the current crisis. 
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 We estimate a series of models to explain this general measure of UK 
liquidity. Our baseline specification includes the current account deficit of the 
G7 economies, the savings rate in the UK, a measure of the looseness of 
monetary policy and a measure of default risk.   We consider two types of 
measure of the looseness of monetary policy.  Following Taylor (2008), we 
use deviations of interest rates from a Taylor rule to measure the difference 
between the interest rate and the rate warranted by values of inflation and the 
output gap.  Another aspect of the looseness of monetary policy concerns the 
money supply.  It has been argued that “excessive” growth in the money 
supply fuels liquidity.  In the pre-crisis period, some commentators (e.g. 
Congdon, 2005) argued that policymakers were wrong to ignore rapid growth 
in the nominal supply (which averaged 9% p.a. in the UK in 2001-2006) 
because of their focus on stabilising inflation and output.  The link between 
the growth rate in the money supply and liquidity has been refined by Adrian 
and Shin (2008) who argue that the relationship is likely to be close when 
banks seek to maintain a fixed leverage ratio.  To test this idea, we use 
deviations of the real money supply from an estimated long-run money 
demand equation as a measure of “excess” money growth.  
Estimates of our baseline specification reveal that the effects of G7 
current account deficits are significant, have the expected sign and are robust 
to the inclusion of other controls as are the effects of the UK savings rate and 
the default spread.  Measures of the looseness of UK monetary policy derived 
from Taylor rules were not significant, but excess money growth is significant 
and correctly-signed.  The rise in liquidity in the pre-crisis period can therefore 
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be explained in terms of high current account deficits, low savings rates, low 
default spreads and a rapid expansion of the money supply. 
We then explore the national and global determinants of liquidity in 
greater detail.  There is evidence that UK liquidity is affected by US monetary 
policy, as both Taylor’s (2008) measure of the looseness of US monetary 
policy, and a measure based on residuals from a real money demand 
function, are correctly-signed and significant.  However, neither performs as 
well as the UK excess money growth measure.  Alternative specifications 
using the UK current account and the G7 savings rate were less successful 
than our baseline specification.  In summary, liquidity in the UK reflects a 
mixture of national and global factors. 
 We also investigate more complex relationships between our 
explanatory variables.  It has been suggested that global imbalances and 
looseness in monetary policy were both necessary pre-conditions for the crisis 
(Bean, 2008, Brunnermeir, 2009, and Morris, 2008).  To capture this, we allow 
for a multiplicative effect from these variables.  We also allow for the 
possibility that financial markets were more responsive to larger current 
account deficits and rates of monetary growth by including threshold effects 
that allow for stronger marginal effects when these variables exceed 
endogenously-determined thresholds.  We find that both types of effect are 
significant.   
  We illustrate our estimates by calculating what liquidity would have 
been in the counterfactual case where the current account remained in 
balance and the real money supply was consistent with long-run growth in 
real money demand throughout our sample period.  We find that there would 
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have been no increase in liquidity in 2001-2007 period.  The marked rise in 
liquidity in this period was therefore due to the effect of current account 
deficits and loose monetary policy.  To the extent that a prior increase was a 
pre-condition for the financial crisis that began in July 2007, we can conclude 
that loose monetary and the deterioration in current account balances were 
causes of the financial crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2) 
describes our data and the specification of our baseline empirical model. 
Section 3) presents estimates of this model.  Section 4) presents estimates of 
extensions to our basic model to allow for interaction and threshold effects.  
Section 5) considers our counterfactual experiment.  Section 6) concludes. 
 
2) Methodology 
Our baseline empirical specification is 
 
(1) 70 1 2 3 4( / )
G ex D
t t t t t tliq ca s yω ω ω ω μ ω σ ε= + + + + +  
 
where liq  is the liquidity index for the UK produced by the Bank of England, 
7Gca is the current account-GDP ratio of the G7 economies, ( / )s y  is the 
savings ratio in the UK, exμ  is a measure of the looseness of UK monetary 
policy, and Dσ  is the default spread (proxied by the spread between 10-year 
A or higher corporate bond and government bond yields).   Previous empirical 
time series models (e.g. Chorida et al, 2001, Fujimoto, 2004) relate liquidity to 
default and term spreads; term spreads were not significant in our study and 
so are omitted from (1). 
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 We use the index of liquidity for the UK calculated by the Bank of 
England.  The index combines data on bid-ask spreads for Gilt Repos, the 
FTSE100 and major currencies, return-to-volume ratios for Gilts, the 
FTSE100 and equity options and liquidity premia, measured as the spread 
between corporate bonds and a credit spread and between bond and Libor 
rates in the US, Euro-zone and the UK (for further details, see Bank of 
England, 2007).  It reflects a mixture of UK-specific and more global 
indicators.  The index is depicted in figure 1a)3, showing the continual rise 
over the five years before 2007 that has been seen as a pre-cursor of the 
crisis, followed by a precipitous decline from mid-2007 as the crisis hit.  The 
effects of earlier crises at the end of the 1990s are also apparent.  The current 
account of the G7 economies is depicted in figure 1b) for our sample period, 
1992Q1 to 2008Q44, where we note a sharp secular decline beginning in 
1998, followed by a persistent deficit of around 2%, giving a substantial and 
sustained global imbalance.  The UK savings rate, depicted in figure 1c), 
shows a secular decline from the early 1990s, with an especially sharp 
decline in the 18 months before the crisis. The default spread, shown in figure 
1d) was stable and low in the years before the crisis, before increasing 
sharply in recent periods.   
We use several alternative measures of the looseness of monetary 
policy in the UK.  First, we consider deviations from the Taylor rule 
 
                                                 
3 The series has been centred and normalised, so a value of 1 represents a 1-standard 
deviation difference from the mean. 
4 Current account data, G7 saving ratios and corporate yields are taken from Datastream.  
The remaining UK data are available from the Bank of England and the Office for National 
Statistics websites.  All US data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
website. 
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(2) 0 1 2( ) ( *)
T
t t j t k iti y yα α π π α ε+ += + − + − +  
 
where i  is the base rate set by the policymakers, π  is the inflation rate, Tπ  is 
the inflation target and ( *)y y−  is the output gap.  We use ext itμ ε= −  as our 
measure of the looseness of monetary policy since a negative value of itε  
implies looser policy.  We use the inflation rate targeted by monetary policy, 
namely the annual change in the RPIX price index until December 2003 and 
the annual change in the CPI thereafter.  Correspondingly, the inflation target 
is 2.5% until December 2003 and 2% thereafter.  The output gap is the 
proportional difference between GDP and its’ Hodrick and Prescott (1997) 
trend.  In our first measure, we follow Taylor (2008) in considering 
contemporaneous values of the inflation and output gaps (where 0j k= = ) and 
imposing 1 1.5α =  and 2 0.5α = .   In our second measure we allow for forward-
looking behaviour by selecting the values of j  and k  that give the best 
empirical fit and estimate 1α  and 2α .  Our third measure of the looseness of 
monetary policy focuses on growth in the real money supply in excess of 
equilibrium real money demand.  We use estimates of the real money 
demand function. 
 
(3) 0 1 2( ) ( )
c L
t t t mtm p y i iβ β β ε− = + + − +  
 
where m  is the log nominal money supply (we use a divisia index measure of 
M4; divisia index measures of the money supply have been argued to have a 
closer relationship to expenditure as it weights the components of the money 
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supply in proportion to their usefulness in making transactions, see Hancock, 
2005, and Darrat et al 2005), cp  is the consumer price index (measured using 
the RPI index) and Li  is the long term interest rate (measured using the 10-
year government bond yield).   This specification echoes Coehen and Vegas 
(2001) and Milas (2009).  We use ext mtμ ε=  as a positive value of mtε  implies 
looser policy.  
These three measures of the looseness of UK monetary policy are 
depicted in Figure 2a)-2c).  We note that the measures derived from a Taylor 
rule show little evidence of loose monetary policy in the pre-crisis period since 
policy rates are rarely more than 100 basis points away from their Taylor rule 
values.  By contrast, the excess money supply measure indicates substantial 
looseness in the pre-crisis period of 2001-2007.   
 
3) Empirical Estimates 
Estimates of the baseline model in (1) are presented in columns (i)-(iii) 
of table 1).  We treat all variables as endogenous and estimate by 
Instrumental Variables (IV) using lagged values as instruments.  The 
specifications in columns (i) and (ii), which use Taylor rule residuals to 
measure the looseness of monetary policy, perform poorly in contrast to the 
specification in column (iii), which uses a measure based on money growth, 
as the fit of the model is worse and these specifications fail a test for 
parameter stability5.   These estimates are robust, save for some fragility in 
the effect of the savings rate.  For example, similar estimates are obtained if 
                                                 
5 We experimented with specifications that allowed Taylor rule residuals to affect liquidity with 
a delay.  The only negative and significant effects were found with a lag of six quarters or 
more; it is implausible that monetary policy would affect liquidity with such a long delay. 
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the OECD current account deficit replaces that of the G7, or if a non-divisia 
measure of the money supply is used. 
We next explore the national and global determinants of liquidity in 
greater detail.  We first consider the effects of US monetary policy on UK 
liquidity.  Figure 2d) depicts the measure used by Taylor (2008), deviations 
from a Taylor rule with imposed coefficients.  In contrast to the corresponding 
UK measure, there is evidence of substantial looseness in the pre-crisis 
period.  Figure 2e) depicts the measure of “excess” monetary growth, which 
also shows considerable looseness in 2001-2007.   Columns (iv) and (v) of 
table 1) report estimates of versions of (1) using these indicators.  Both 
models perform well but neither is superior to the model in column (iii).  
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 2) repeat the specification of column (iii) of table 
1) but with the UK rather than the G7 current account (column (i)) and the G7 
rather than UK savings rate (column (ii)).  The UK current account is 
insignificant, while the G7 savings rate is significant; the fit of both models is 
again worse than column (iii) of table 1).    
 Adrian and Shin (2009) report that a liquidity-related variable, the 
growth in repo trades by US prime brokers, is negatively related to stock 
market volatility, suggesting an inverse relationship between liquidity and 
volatility (possibly because higher volatility implies greater risk).  To allow for 
this, we augment the baseline specification with a measure of the volatility of 
interest rates: 
 
(4) 70 1 2 3 4 5( / )
G ex D i
t t t t t t tliq ca s y Vω ω ω ω μ ω σ ω ε= + + + + + +  
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where iV  is the volatility of the UK base rate (specifically the 8-quarter moving 
standard deviation of the base rate; this is reported in Figure 3) and where we 
use the “excess” money growth measure of the looseness of monetary policy 
in this and subsequent models.    Estimates of this extended specification are 
presented in column (iii) of table 2).  The effect of volatility is negative, and 
significant.  Inclusion of the volatility measure highlights the fragility of 
estimates of the savings rate.  Given this, we drop the savings rate from our 
model, giving a simplified specification, estimates of which are presented in 
column (iv).  We also experimented with measures of the fiscal deficit and 
government debt as a proportion of GDP and of the volatility of output growth; 
none of these were significant. 
 
4) Interaction and Threshold Effects 
The models estimated thus far assume that explanatory variables have a 
linear effect on liquidity.  Given the complexity of financial markets, it might be 
argued that this is overly-simple.  For example, the impact of global 
imbalances and looseness in monetary policy might be multiplicative 
(consistent with arguments in e.g. Bean, 2008, Brunnermeir, 2009, and 
Morris, 2008, that both were necessary pre-conditions for the crisis).  It might 
also be argued that financial markets were more responsive to exceptionally 
large current account deficits and monetary growth, suggesting a stronger 
effect from larger values of these imbalances. 
 To test these ideas, we estimate the augmented model 
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(5)
7 7 7
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8* ca
G ex D i G ex G ex
t t t t t t t t t tliq ca V ca ca μτ τω ω ω μ ω σ ω ω μ ω ω μ ε> >= + + + + + + + +
 
where 7 7ca
G G
t tca caτ> =  if 7G catca τ≥  and 7 0caG tca τ> =  if 7G catca τ<   and 
ex ex
t tμτμ μ> =  if ext μμ τ≥  and 0ext μτμ > =  if ext μμ τ<  and caτ  and μτ  are 
parameters to be estimated.  In (5), the marginal impact of current account 
deficits on liquidity is 71 6 7 G ca
ex
t ca
I τω ω μ ω >+ + , where 7G cacaI τ>  is an indicator 
function taking the value of 1 if the current account exceeds caτ , and 0 
otherwise.  The parameter 6ω  captures multiplicative effects.  The parameter 
7ω  allows the impact of current account deficits to vary depending on whether 
the deficit exceeds caτ %; if 7 0ω < , then liquidity is more sensitive to larger 
current account deficits.  Similarly, the marginal impact of monetary policy 
looseness is 73 6 8 ex
t
ex G
t tca I μμ τω μ ω ω >+ +  which depends on both imbalance 
measures, where 6ω  again captures multiplicative effects and 8ω  allows the 
impact of monetary policy looseness to depend on the size of the variable. 
  Estimates of this model are presented in column (v) of table 2)6.  The 
standard error is substantially lower than any previous model.  The estimate 
of 6ω  is significant, indicating an interaction effect.  We estimate caτ =1.8%; 
and find that current account deficits which exceed this threshold have a 
marginal impact about 70% larger. G7 current account deficits exceeded 1.8% 
in 2005-2007, so a combination of substantial deficits and an increased 
                                                 
6  Chan (1993) shows how to obtain a super-consistent estimate of the thresholds; we choose 
the combination of extμ  and 7G tca  values that delivers the lowest residual sum of squares for 
the estimated regression. 
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marginal effect imparted a strong impact on liquidity in the immediate pre-
crisis period.  The estimate of 8ω  is significant but the estimate of 3ω  is not, 
showing that liquidity is only affected by loose monetary policy once this 
exceeds 2.1%, our estimate of μτ .  This threshold was breached in 2001-
2007, indicating that loose monetary policy also contributed to the rise in 
liquidity in the pre-crisis period. 
 
5) Assessment and counterfactuals 
In this section we quantify the impact of current account deficits and loose 
monetary policy.  We calculate the time path liquidity would have taken in the 
counterfactual case where the current account was in balance and the real 
money supply was consistent with long-run growth in real money demand.  
We calculate this as  
 
6) 0 4 5ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
D i
t t tliq Vω ω σ ω= + +  
 
where ˆliq  is the counterfactual value of liquidity, and 0ωˆ , 4ωˆ  and 5ωˆ  are 
estimated parameters.  
 We plot actual and counterfactual values of liquidity in figure 4), where 
we use estimates of our preferred model in column (v) of table 2).  The two 
series are similar, save for the 2001-2007 period.  There is no growth in 
liquidity in this period in the counterfactual case.   Therefore the marked rise 
in liquidity in this period was due to the effect of current account deficits and 
loose monetary policy.    
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6) Conclusions 
This paper has presented an empirical model of the macroeconomic 
determinants of liquidity that focuses on the effects of global imbalances and 
monetary policy.  We argue that the increase in liquidity in 2001-2007 was 
due to large and persistent current account deficits and to loose monetary 
policy in this period.  These factors can therefore be seen to some extent as 
causes of the major financial crisis that began in July 2007. 
 Our results suggest that the exclusive focus of monetary policymakers 
on stabilising inflation and output may have in part contributed to the creation 
of the pre-conditions for the financial crisis.  Arguably, a policy response to the 
increasing build up of liquidity might have prevented or at least lessened the 
crisis.  Of course, it is difficult to assess whether the build up of liquidity is 
“excessive” in real time and trends that are clear in retrospect may not be 
obvious at the time.  Nonetheless, recent experience suggests that some sort 
of pre-emptive response to similar situations in future may be warranted.  
 Our study is not definitive.  We use a national measure of liquidity 
specific to the UK, consider a relatively limited set of explanatory variables 
and have little data from the crisis period.  A more comprehensive study that 
uses a global liquidity measure, or measures from more countries, that has a 
larger set of explanatory variables and which takes a longer time perspective 
with more data from the crisis period may reach more definitive conclusions.  
Nonetheless, we feel our study is interesting and suggestive.  We intend to 
develop it in subsequent work. 
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Figure 1: Liquidity, G7 current account-GDP ratio, savings ratio and default 
spread. 
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Figure 2: Measures of monetary looseness 
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Figure 3: Volatility of the UK base rate 
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Figure 4: Actual and counterfactual values of liquidity 
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Table 1): IV Estimates of liquidity equation, 1992Q1-2008Q4 
7
0 1 2 3 4( / )
G ex D
t t t t t tliq ca s yω ω ω ω μ ω σ ε= + + + + +  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Monetary policy 
measure 
UK Taylor 
rule* 
(imposed) 
UK Taylor 
rule** 
(estimated)  
UK Money 
supply*** 
US Taylor 
rule* 
(imposed) 
US Money 
supply**** 
0ω   1.040 (0.253)  1.039 (0.254)  0.891 (0.159)  1.678 (0.183)  1.445 (0.344) 
1ω   -0.247 (0.076) -0.251 (0.085) -0.195 (0.034) -0.251 (0.059) -0.183 (0.050) 
2ω  -0.041 (0.018) -0.047 (0.020) -0.027 (0.013) -0.094 (0.015) -0.049 (0.034) 
3ω   0.045 (0.046) -0.129 (0.080)  0.038 (0.006)   0.083 (0.034)   0.036 (0.007) 
4ω  -1.192 (0.164) -1.187 (0.160) -1.001 (0.075) -1.245 (0.117) -1.058 (0.105) 
Regression standard 
error  
  0.302   0.303   0.228   0.280  0.278 
2R     0.661   0.658   0.807   0.680  0.753 
AR(4) (p-value)   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.03  0.04 
Het (p-value)   0.84   0.82   0.85   0.84  0.81 
Parameter stability 
(p-value) 
  0.00   0.00   0.08   0.04  0.05 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter 
stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996). The instruments are a 
constant and four lags of the base rate, liquidity, the current account, the savings rate, the default 
spread, the monetary looseness and the volatility measure. AR(4) is the Breusch-Godfrey 4rth 
order serial correlation F-test.  Het is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F-test for heteroskedasticity. 
* Taylor rule is given by 0 1 2( ) ( *)
T
t t j t k iti y yα α π π α ε+ += + − + − + , where where 0j k= =  and 
we have imposed 1 1.5α =  and 2 0.5α = .   
** Taylor rule is given by:  
3 0 3 1 3 2 3 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( *)
T
t t j t k t iti a a a y y a iα α π π α ε+ + −= − + − − + − − + + , where 8,j =  0k = , 
0α  is estimated at 4.12 (standard error=0.40), 1α  is estimated at 3.88 (standard error=1.34), 2α  is 
estimated at 2.50 (standard error=0.89) and we have allowed for interest rate smoothing. We have 
used the 8-quarter ahead inflation forecast provided by the Bank of England Quarterly Inflation 
Report (available from www. bankofengland.co.uk).   
*** UK Money supply residuals from: 0 1 2( ) ( )
c L
t t t mtm p y i iβ β β ε− = + + − + .  We estimate 0β =-
15.71 (standard error=0.361), 1β =1.38 (standard error=0.029) and 2β =-0.01 (standard 
error=0.002).  
**** US Money supply residuals from: 0 1 2( )
c
t t t mtm p y i− = + + +β β β ε , where m  is the M2 stock 
of money, cp  is the consumer price index, ty  is GDP and ti  is the federal funds rate.  We 
estimate 0β =-5.02 (standard error=0.243), 1β =0.92 (standard error=0.026) and 2β =-0.02 
(standard error=0.001).  
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Table 2): Further IV Estimates of liquidity equation, 1992Q1-2008Q4 
7 7 7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
( / ) * ca
G ex D i G ex G
t t t t t t t t t
ex
t t
liq ca s y V ca ca
μ
τ
τ
ω ω ω ω μ ω σ ω ω μ ω
ω μ ε
>
>
= + + + + + + +
+ +  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Monetary policy 
measure 
UK Money 
supply*** 
UK Money 
supply*** 
UK Money 
supply*** 
UK Money 
supply*** 
UK Money 
supply*** 
0ω   1.290 (0.150)  1.655 (0.269)  1.098 (0.142)  0.886 (0.077)  0.470 (0.126) 
1ω   -0.021 (0.028) -0.105 (0.047) -0.122 (0.035) -0.157 (0.034) -0.279 (0.050) 
2ω  -0.061 (0.012) -0.095 (0.024) -0.020 (0.011)    
3ω   0.041 (0.009)  0.032 (0.005)  0.041 (0.005)  0.044 (0.005)  0.020 (0.011) 
4ω  -1.023 (0.084) -0.956 (0.065) -1.020 (0.081) -0.947 (0.058) -0.854 (0.053) 
5ω    -0.273 (0.046)   -0.300 (0.044) -0.149 (0.074) 
6ω     -0.021 (0.009) 
7ω     -0.193 (0.092) 
8ω      0.151 (0.064) 
caτ      1.8 
μτ      2.1 
Regression standard 
error  
  0.250   0.232   0.208  0.200  0.180 
2R     0.768   0.799   0.840  0.851  0.876 
AR(4) (p-value)   0.04   0.10   0.12  0.16  0.17 
Het (p-value)   0.80   0.82   0.82  0.83   0.84 
Parameter stability 
(p-value) 
  0.05   0.10   0.10  0.12   0.15 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Parameter stability is an F test of 
parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 1996). 
*** Money supply residuals from: 0 1 2( ) ( )
c L
t t t mtm p y i iβ β β ε− = + + − + .  We estimate 
0β =-15.71 (standard error=0.361), 1β =1.38 (standard error=0.029) and 2β =-0.01 (standard 
error=0.002). 
 
